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A Positive Account of Protention and its Implications for Internal Time-1 
Consciousness 2 
 3 
Neal DeRoo 4 
 5 
Protention is often understood as being equivalent to retention but functioning in the 6 
other (future) direction. This, I would argue, has prevented a full appreciation of protention’s 7 
importance to phenomenological scholarship. In this paper, I will elucidate Husserl’s positive 8 
account of protention. I will argue that the view that protention is like retention, but in the other 9 
direction, is insufficient. Abandoning this negative view, I will explain what is unique about 10 
protention, and how it helps make sense of such key phenomenological concepts as fulfillment, 11 
passive intentionality, and self-constitution.  12 
I will begin by briefly sketching out Husserl’s broad position on internal time-13 
consciousness, thereby showing how protention can be understood as an inverse retention 14 
(Section I). Next, I will move to a closer examination of the concept of retention, in order to 15 
begin to understand what it would mean for protention to be an inverse retention. In this 16 
examination, it will become clear that retention enables Husserl to escape the content-17 
apprehension schema, and the problems that result therefrom (especially the problem of infinite 18 
regress), via the twofold intentionality of retention and its relation to absolute consciousness 19 
(Section II). Alongside this advance will emerge the question of how retention is able to foster 20 
such a double-intentionality. The distinction between general and particular fulfillment will 21 
begin to solve this problem of the constitution of the double-intentionality. In doing so, it will 22 
suggest that the concept of protention might be a more fruitful area of analysis than is retention 23 
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for trying to determine the possibility of the constitution of the double-intentionality of absolute 24 
consciousness (Section III). I will then take up this suggestion, and note how the “striving” 25 
character of protention, and the two distinct modes (i.e., clarifying and confirming) of bringing to 26 
intuition that protention makes possible, are both unique to protention and necessary for the 27 
constitution of the double-intentionality of absolute consciousness, thereby finally confirming 28 
that protention is more than an inverse retention (Section IV). I will end by drawing out the 29 
implications of this positive account of protention for our understanding of retention and its 30 
relationship to absolute consciousness. This conclusion will suggest that several other key 31 
aspects of phenomenological thought should also be re-evaluated in light of this positive account 32 
of protention, and that such a re-evaluation will have consequences for fields as diverse as ethics, 33 
politics and psychology.  34 
 35 
I. Husserl on Time 36 
 37 
In On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (Hua X), 1 Husserl 38 
develops a notion of the “internal” time of the constituting ego. In discussing the immanent time 39 
of the flow of consciousness, Husserl expounds a three-fold notion of time as primary 40 
impression, retention, and protention.2 On this model, immanent time begins with primary 41 
                                                 
1 All quotations from Hua X are taken from Husserl 1991. 
2 It is not until the time of Texts n. 50 and 51 (dated by Rudolf Bernet between October of 1908 
and Summer of 1909) that Husserl replaces his initial talk of “primary memory” with language 
of “retention.” For simplicity’s sake, I have stayed with retention throughout the essay. For more 
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sensation. These primary sensations then “remain” briefly in consciousness, in the mode of a 42 
“running-off” (Hua X, 27ff.), and are constantly modified in this running-off: as I am confronted 43 
with new sensations in every instant,3 the immediately previous sensations are not removed from 44 
consciousness, but remain, albeit in modified form—no longer conceived as present, but as just-45 
past. This aspect of consciousness’ ability to retain the immediately previous sensations is 46 
deemed “retention.” Protention emerges here as the correlate of retention, that which works like 47 
retention but in the other, future, direction (Hua X, 55; see also Hua III/1, § 77 and § 81). In 48 
protention, rather than retaining a past instant, I protend or “anticipate”4 what will be sensed in 49 
immediately future instants. If, at time D, I have a sensation of D and a retention of C, Dc, then I 50 
will also have a protention of E, `E, that anticipates the next instant E as not-yet-in-the-now (Hua 51 
X, 77, 373), such that at the next instant, E, I will sense E, have a retention of D, Ed, and a 52 
                                                                                                                                                             
on the change of terminology and how it relates to the development of Husserl’s account of time-
consciousness in Hua X, see Brough 1972, 314-15. 
3The instant is what Husserl calls the “now-point”: it exists only as the phase of a continuum, and 
“is conceivable only as the limit of a continuum of retentions, just as every retentional phase is 
itself conceivable only as a point belonging to such a continuum; and this is true of every now of 
time-consciousness” (Hua X, 33). Even as a limit, the now is only an “ideal limit” (Hua X, 40). 
We will see that as the analysis of protention deepens in the later works, this concept of the 
“now-point” is de-emphasized. 
4 Though this must be kept distinct from actively anticipating a future event, which would be the 
intentional act of anticipation, rather than the protentional modification of the intentional act of 
perception. The same goes for retention, which must be kept distinct from the intentional act of 
reproducing or recollecting (see Hua X, §§ 14-19, especially § 19).  
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secondary retention of C, Ec,5 along with a protention of F, `F, and so on (see Hua X, 28; Zahavi 53 
1999, 66).  54 
This “temporality” of consciousness is metaphorically called “flow” (Hua X, 75).6 55 
Within this flow, protention is understood as retention “turned upside down” (Hua X, 55-56), 56 
that is, retention in the other direction. Thought in terms of the movement of the flow relative to 57 
the now-point of the primal impression, this is perhaps understandable. But is it correct? To 58 
answer this, we must turn to a more in-depth study of the individual acts that make up Husserl’s 59 
theory of time, and specifically, in line with the aim of this paper, to protention. However, while 60 
Husserl discusses primary impression and retention at length, protention does not get much more 61 
than a few passing mentions in these lectures. Given that protention is claimed to be like 62 
retention but in the other direction, this might not prove to be too problematic, if we can get an 63 
adequate understanding of retention. Therefore, let us turn first to retention. 64 
 65 
II. Retention and Absolute Consciousness 66 
                                                 
5 That is, a retention (Ec) of the retention (Dc) of C. 
6William James uses the metaphor of a rainbow before a waterfall to illustrate the flow: while the 
rainbow remains constant, the material that makes up the rainbow, the individual particles of 
water that reflect sunlight and hence give off the appearance of the rainbow, are constantly 
changing, constantly moving, as the water continues to flow; see James 1981, 593. For a more 
thorough explanation of the relation between Husserl’s and James’ theories of time-
consciousness, see Cobb-Stevens 1998. 
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 Initially, Husserl thought that retention enabled consciousness to keep past moments in 67 
the present consciousness,7 and he struggled with the question of how retention was able to 68 
achieve this. In lecture notes from 1904-1905 that make up the bulk of the first portion of 69 
Husserliana X, Husserl still believed that retention functioned on the model of content and 70 
apprehension: the shading-off or adumbration functions as the content that is apprehended by the 71 
present consciousness as just past. However, Husserl would soon realize that this model of 72 
retention is unsatisfactory, as apprehension-content can be the content for only one apprehension, 73 
and therefore the content that is present to consciousness at A can only be used to apprehend the 74 
now-phase of A. In order for a retention to be understood as a retention of a past moment, it must 75 
already be modified. In being aware of the past as past, therefore, retention is a modifying 76 
consciousness, that is, a consciousness through and through.8  77 
 The danger here, of course, is an infinite regress: if retention is already a constituted 78 
consciousness, then there must be some other level of consciousness that constitutes that level, 79 
and so on, ad infinitum. Husserl’s notion of absolute consciousness (Hua XXIV, 245) is meant to 80 
answer this problem of infinite regress. To avoid infinite regress, absolute consciousness must be 81 
self-constituting (Hua X, 378-379). It can be so because of what Husserl calls the double 82 
intentionality of retention: retentional intentionality is both a transverse [Querintentionalität] and 83 
                                                 
7This was necessary, according to the prevalent view during Husserl’s time. Meinong was the 
major proponent of this view, which stated that temporally distributed objects can only be 
presented by temporally undistributed presentations; see Meinong 1978 and Kortooms 2002, 39-
43. 
8 In this regard, it is similar to the phantasm of phantasy-consciousness; see Hua XXIV, 260 note 
1.  
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an horizontal intentionality [Längsintentionalität] (Hua X, 380). The first intentionality makes 84 
possible the presentation of objects to consciousness. The second makes possible the (self-) 85 
presentation of the stream of absolute consciousness in which the perception of temporality is 86 
possible, and makes it possible because, by way of this horizontal intentionality, absolute 87 
consciousness “constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself” (Hua X, 381). What this double-88 
intentionality makes possible, then, is that one act (retention) constitutes both the immanent 89 
objects of consciousness, and the consciousness of the different temporal modes of givenness of 90 
that object over time.  91 
 92 
III. Fulfillment and Protention as (more than) Inverse Retention 93 
 94 
However, Husserl himself raises questions about retention’s ability to achieve this 95 
double-intentionality. In trying to make sense of the role that retentions play in constituting the 96 
“unitary stream of experience,” Husserl claims that we must take into account the fact that every 97 
retention “contains expectation-intentions whose fulfillment leads to the present” (Hua X, 52). 98 
Hence, it is the concept of fulfillment that is able to “tie” retentions to the present of the stream 99 
of consciousness, and this because of the presence of protention: “Every process that constitutes 100 
its object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, 101 
that catch it and bring it toward fulfillment” (52). It is the fulfillment of these emptily constituted 102 
protentions that we are made aware of in retention (52).  103 
 152 
Unfortunately, Husserl does not develop this intriguing notion in any more detail in Hua 104 
X. He does, however, develop it in more detail in other texts of this time (c. 1917).9 In 105 
addressing it, Husserl starts to move away from the notion of protention as merely an inverse 106 
retention, and begins to develop a positive account of protention. In the “Bernau Manuscripts” of 107 
1917-1918, Husserl begins to realize that protention, in its capacity for fulfillment, promises to 108 
be a more fertile ground for a phenomenological analysis of absolute consciousness (Hua 109 
XXXIII, 225-226).10 The notion of fulfillment gives Husserl a stronger account of how absolute 110 
consciousness is self-constituting, one that answers how we can come to know the self-111 
constituting character of absolute consciousness. In order to fulfill a protention, an act must be 112 
aware, not just of the constitution of the present object, but also of the constitution of the 113 
preceding act anticipating fulfillment. Hence, there is a two-fold coincidence between protended 114 
and present moments: first, there is a coincidence between the previous protentional intention 115 
and the primal presentation (Hua XXXIII, 25); second, there is a coincidence between that 116 
toward which both the protention and the primal presentation are directed. The first of these 117 
Husserl describes under the rubric of “general fulfillment,” and the second under “particular 118 
fulfillment” (Hua XXXIII, 29-30). General fulfillment plays a role in the self-constitution of the 119 
primal stream, thought along the lines of the stream’s “self-relatedness” (Selbstbezogenheit, Hua 120 
XXXIII, 207). Particular fulfillment plays a role in the constitution of the immanent temporal 121 
                                                 
9 § 24, from which the above quotes from Hua X, 52 were taken, was composed at a later date 
than most of the rest of the first portion of Hua X. In being written specifically for the compiled 
edition prepared by Edith Stein, § 24 was written in 1917; see Boehm’s note on Hua X, 52; 
Husserl 1991, 54 note 36. 
10All translations from this volume are from Kortooms 2002, unless otherwise noted. 
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objects.11 Hence, the notion of fulfillment is able to explain why the double-intentionality needed 122 
to make absolute consciousness self-constituting is united in protention in way that could not be 123 
so easily explained in retention. Let us examine this idea of fulfillment in more detail. 124 
 125 
A. General Fulfillment 126 
 127 
 General fulfillment provides Husserl with a way of conceiving the constitution of the 128 
primal stream of absolute consciousness: because every moment is the fulfillment of a previous 129 
protention, every moment can be connected to the previous moment via this general fulfillment. 130 
In describing this general fulfillment by claiming that “fulfillment contains in itself retention of 131 
the previous intention” (Hua XXXIII, 25), Husserl indicates that every protention has a 132 
retentional aspect, and every retention a protentional aspect (Hua XXXIII, 21-22). Every 133 
protention grows out of a retentional horizon.12 Conversely, every point of any momentary phase 134 
                                                 
11One must be careful to distinguish the immanent temporal objects that appear pre-
phenomenally in the primal stream of absolute consciousness from the immanent temporal 
objects of intentional acts. This difference is marked in Husserl by the designation of the former 
objects as being constituted by a “passive intentionality,” vis-à-vis the “active intentionality” of 
the second level of consciousness (Hua XI, § 18). The issue of the status of what I am here 
calling the immanent temporal objects has been disputed recently (see Zahavi 1999, 69-75; 
Zahavi 2000; Zahavi 2004). There is not time to get into this debate here. Those interested in 
knowing more are invited to consult the cited texts. 
12 “The style of the past becomes projected into the future” (Ms. L I 15, p. 32b [THIS PASSAGE 
IS NOW IN HUA 33. Give references. THE PASSAGES CAN BE TRACED IN THE 
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of consciousness has an essentially protentional aspect, in that every point is directed towards its 135 
fulfillment in the corresponding point of the following momentary phase of consciousness.13 As 136 
                                                                                                                                                             
“NACHWEIS DER ORIGINALSEITEN” in the back of the vol.]) [I would prefer to maintain 
reference to the L manuscripts and to Mensch’s specific translation of it in Mensch 1999 for the 
reasons given in this note; I would be willing to add reference to Hua XXXIII in addition to this. 
However, I currently have no lending privileges at my university [my contract does not begin 
again until September], so am unable to access the volume there. If you have easy access to the 
volume, would you be able to find these references for me? If not, let me know soon, and I will 
try to borrow a colleague’s card and see if I can get my hands on the volume that way. Sorry for 
this inconvenience], translated in Mensch 1999, 43, 57 note 7. The “L” Manuscripts form the 
textual basis of Hua XXXIII. Some of the research on Husserl’s concept of protention precedes 
the publication of Hua XXXIII. For accuracy’s sake, I have maintained the reference to the L 
manuscript when using translations of this material that pre-date Hua XXXIII. Some later 
scholars (e.g., Rodemeyer 2003) have persisted in using the L manuscripts rather than Hua 
XXXIII. Though the reason for their decision is not explained, I have chosen to again maintain 
reference to the L Manuscripts rather than Hua XXXIII when using translations from those 
scholars, in keeping with their own preference for the L manuscripts. 
13To go back to our above example: if a moment E contains an impression of E, a retention of D, 
Ed, a secondary retention of C, Ec, and a protention of F, `F, then we must understand each of 
these moments, and not just `F, as protentional: just as `F protends its givenness in the next 
instant as F, so too E protends its givenness in the next instant as Fe, Ed protends its givenness as 
Fd, and Ec as Fc; see Hua XXXIII, 21-22; Kortooms 2002, 160; and Zahavi 1999, 66. Husserl 
revises his earlier diagram on internal time-consciousness (Hua X, 28) with more complex 
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such, all points along the vertical line of each instant can be viewed as protentions, and not just 137 
those that we originally called protentions (indicated in our example by the `). Further, it is only 138 
because of these implicit protentions that we can speak of retentions as retaining anything at all: 139 
it is the character of fulfillment that entails that the previous instant has been retained (see Hua 140 
X, 52), and this is true for every point of a momentary phase of consciousness, not just that point 141 
which is a primal impression (F) of what had immediately prior been the primal protention (`F).  142 
It is because of the coincidence entailed in this notion of fulfillment that Husserl is able to 143 
posit the self-relatedness that characterizes the stream of absolute consciousness and enables it to 144 
avoid the problem of infinite regress: because this coincidence happens in the very fulfillment, 145 
there is no need of another act beyond the coincidence to unite the past to the future (Hua 146 
XXXIII, 27). While the sixth Logical Investigation seems to indicate that consciousness of 147 
fulfillment requires three elements (namely a consciousness that must be fulfilled, a 148 
consciousness that fulfills, and a synthesizing consciousness that ties the first two together such 149 
that one can be conscious of the fulfillment), the position that Husserl describes in the Bernau 150 
Manuscripts is that, because of the essential role of protention, this third element (which quickly 151 
would lead to a problem of infinite regress) is no longer necessary. As Kortooms describes it: the 152 
“consciousness that fulfills is at the same time conscious of itself as being a consciousness that 153 
fulfills. Such self-consciousness is possible because the consciousness that fulfills itself retains 154 
the protentional directedness toward fulfillment that belonged to the preceding phase of 155 
consciousness” (Kortooms 2002, 162). Husserl is thereby able to avoid the problem of infinite 156 
regress, as there is no longer recourse to an ‘external’ synthesizing consciousness beyond the 157 
                                                                                                                                                             
descriptions of retention in Hua XXXIII, 34-35; these are drawn out in diagram form in 
Kortooms 2002, 167, 168.  
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fulfillment.14 This self-related fulfillment is continuously occurring in general fulfillment, in 158 
which protention protends the mode of givenness of what is to come: E protends its being given 159 
in the next instant as a retention, Fe, Ed protends its being given in the next instant as a 160 
secondary retention, Fd, and `F protends its being given in the next instant as F. But again, the 161 
mutual implication of protention and retention is at work, as, conversely, Fe retains the 162 
protentional directedness of E as well as its fulfillment, F retains the protentional directedness of 163 
`F and its fulfillment, and Fd retains the protentional directedness of Ed and its fulfillment (as 164 
well as the protentional directedness of D and its fulfillment in Ed, etc.). This complex 165 
relationship between protention and retention is able to do away with talk of primal impression:15 166 
rather than protending or retaining a particular sensation-content, protentions protend retentions, 167 
and retentions retain protentions (as well as the retention of previous protentions).16 As Husserl 168 
puts it: 169 
                                                 
14 As was the case in the early accounts of internal time consciousness (e.g., when Husserl was 
still employing the content-apprehension schema; see above), and as would be the case if he 
maintained the notion of fulfillment introduced in the sixth of the Logical Investigations. 
15 That it is able to do away with such talk does not mean that Husserl always consistently does 
so. The talk of primal impression will remain intermittently throughout the middle and later 
writings. Lanei Rodemeyer would prefer to replace talk of primal impression with that of 
“moment of actualization,” which she claims is less likely to reify the idea of a “now-point,” 
which has always been an idealized abstraction for Husserl (see Hua X, 40; and above, note 3); 
see Rodemeyer 2003, 131 ff. and 150 note 11. 
16 This constitutes an advance, of sorts, on Husserl’s earlier claims that retentions retain 
retentions (Hua X, 81). 
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That which came before as such is retained in a new retentional consciousness and this 171 
consciousness is, on the one hand, characterized in itself as fulfillment of what was 172 
earlier, and on the other, as retention of what was earlier... The earlier consciousness is 173 
protention (i.e., an intention “directed” at what comes later) and the following retention 174 
would then be retention of the earlier retention that is characterized at the same time as 175 
[its] protention. This newly arriving retention thus reproduces the earlier retention with 176 
its protentional tendency and at the same time fulfills it, but it fulfills it in such a way that 177 
going through this fulfillment is a protention of the next phase (Ms. L I 15, 24a-b; as 178 
translated in Rodemeyer 2003, 131). 179 
 180 
All this makes Husserl able to say that the “now is constituted through the form of protentional 181 
fulfillment, and the past through a retentional modification of this fulfillment” (Ms. L I 16, 9a; as 182 
translated in Rodemeyer 2003, 138).  183 
 184 
B. Particular Fulfillment 185 
 186 
 The emphasis on the “form” or structure of the flow as made up of the movements of 187 
protention and retention marks the fundamental difference between general and particular 188 
fulfillment. It also entails that, no matter what comes, consciousness remains structurally open to 189 
a future that remains yet to come.17 This structural openness is infinite, as every moment would 190 
                                                 
17 The structural openness to the future is present already in Hua X: “But there is an essential 
difference between protention, which leaves open the way in which what is coming may exist 
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contain a protention, `F, of the next instant, F, which itself would protend its givenness in the 191 
following moment as Gf, etc., as well as the protention, ``G, of that next instant’s protention, `G, 192 
of the instant, G, that comes immediately after that, and so on, ad infinitum.18 To avoid a new 193 
problem of infinite regress, Husserl employs the idea of particular fulfillment. If protention, via 194 
general fulfillment, constitutes the self-relatedness of absolute consciousness, thereby avoiding 195 
the old problem of infinite regress, protention also, via particular fulfillment, constitutes the 196 
immanent object, thereby avoiding the new problem of infinite regress.  197 
In particular fulfillment, fulfillment occurs gradually, as reflected in the modes of 198 
givenness of the temporal object as they differ according to degrees of fullness. The nearer the 199 
object gets to me (physically and temporally), the fuller is the intuition I am able to have of it. 200 
The givenness of the object, then, tends toward a culmination (Hua XXXIII, 30) or saturation 201 
point (Hua XXXIII, 39) of greatest fullness, which is also the point of minimal evacuation (Hua 202 
XXXIII, 30). This point is the primal impression, which functions as the terminus ad quem of 203 
protentions and the terminus a quo of retentions (Hua XXXIII, 38).  204 
 The culmination point applies only to what Husserl calls the “domain of intuition.” This 205 
domain is distinct from the domain of non-intuitive differentiation, which is characterized by a 206 
certain empty, non-intuitive potential for differentiating the points of an immanent temporal 207 
                                                                                                                                                             
and whether or not the duration of the object may cease and when it may cease, and retention, 
which is bound” (Husserl’s marginal note added to Hua X, 297; Husserl 1991, 309 note 42). 
18 The retention of previous retentions and protentions would also border on infinite. However, 
the openness of protention marks an essential difference from the necessarily “bound” nature of 
retention (see note on Hua X, 297, and note 17 above). This will be discussed in greater detail in 
Section IV below. 
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object.19 The limit of the intuitive domain is what Husserl calls the zero of intuition (Hua 208 
XXXIII, 227). This limit prevents the problem of infinite regress because of the finite nature of 209 
intuition: we cannot intuit an infinite number of things. In the domain of non-intuitive 210 
differentiation, however, we can theoretically distinguish an infinite number of different points, 211 
that is, an infinite number of potential protentions and retentions attaching to every momentary 212 
phase of consciousness. This domain is limited again by the point at which consciousness falls 213 
away, a second zero. Here, however, the limit is an open point without differences (Hua XXXIII, 214 
227-228), that is, the point in which there exists, theoretically, an infinite number of points that 215 
consciousness cannot practically differentiate (e.g., all the future protentions mentioned above). 216 
There is, then, a certain potential infinity in both the protentional and retentional directions. 217 
However, this potential infinity does not succumb to the problem of infinite regress because no 218 
one, and certainly not Husserl, has claimed that consciousness can retain or protend over an 219 
infinite span of time. Indeed, quite the opposite—the period of retention and protention is 220 
severely limited, tied, as it is, to the “primal impression.”20 This, I would argue, avoids the 221 
                                                 
19 This distinction is called for by the double meaning of retention and protention implied by the 
striving character that marks fulfillment. This double meaning implies that the same retentional 
instant can be simultaneously seen as a fulfillment (of the protentional directedness of the 
previous instant) and as a de-filling (Entfüllung; see Hua XXXIII, 30) with regard to the fullness 
of the object’s givenness. 
20 See our earlier discussion of general fulfillment, above. 
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problem of infinite regress in its most damaging guise, while still leaving consciousness 222 
necessarily open in the direction of protention and retention.21 223 
 224 
IV. Differentiating protention and retention 225 
 226 
 The difference in direction highlights what has, up to now, been the main (perhaps only) 227 
difference between protention and retention: one deals with the future, the other with the past. 228 
Even the act of fulfillment, in itself, does not favor protention over retention, as both are 229 
necessary for fulfillment to occur (Hua XXXIII, 46).  230 
But it is not accidental that the discussion of fulfillment occurs at the same time as 231 
Husserl increases his focus on protention. There is something essentially different about 232 
protention that gives it a unique function in fulfillment, and hence a unique function in absolute 233 
consciousness and everything this makes possible in phenomenology. What makes protention 234 
intrinsically different from retention is the “striving” character of protention (Hua XI, 73). 235 
Husserl makes clear that the striving characteristic of protention is a passive directedness, a 236 
“passive intentionality” (Hua XI, 76), with which the ego has no active involvement (Hua XI, 237 
86). This “striving” character, Husserl claims, belongs intrinsically to protention, and protention 238 
alone: while retention may acquire this striving character, it does not intrinsically possess it. In 239 
other words, though we can “cast a backward turning glance” toward the past, this is a 240 
subsequent act which is distinct from retention, and we must “clearly differentiate between the 241 
direction of the egoic regard, and the direction in perception itself that already takes place prior 242 
                                                 
21 Kortooms gives a much more in-depth discussion of this new problem of infinite regress and 
its potential solutions than is needed for this paper in Kortooms 2002, 169-174.  
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to the apprehending regard” (Hua XI, 74).22 Indeed, Husserl seems to say that an intentionally-243 
directed retention ceases to be retention; rather, once “awakened” by a directed consciousness, it 244 
“should already be characterized as a remembering” (Hua XI, 80) rather than as a retaining.23 To 245 
be directed toward the past, then, is to be remembering, not retaining. Retention retains the past 246 
in a temporality that is in the present, always moving toward the future. Hence, retention is not 247 
directed toward the past.  248 
Because it is not directed, then, retention does not bear the same necessary relation to 249 
intentionality as does protention. Protention, and protention alone, becomes a necessary aspect of 250 
intentionality: without protention, there would be no intentionality.24 The openness to 251 
temporality that goes beyond its own fulfillment which is constitutive of protention is the same 252 
directedness beyond immediate fulfillment that characterizes intentionality. In fact, Husserl will 253 
say that intentions and expectations “are two sides of one and the same thing” (Ms. L I 16, 5b; as 254 
translated in Rodemeyer 2003, 137). The directedness of protention, then, is a necessary aspect 255 
                                                 
22 All quotations from this volume are from Husserl 2001b. 
23 This seems to be in line with some of the later texts from Hua X, e.g., Text n. 54 (which is 
dated no earlier than the end of 1911): “We rather call it the retention of the earlier primal 
sensation, when it is a question of a consciousness in the original flow of the modifications of 
sensation; otherwise we call it a reproduction of the earlier sensation. We must adhere to this 
distinction consistently” (Hua X, 377). 
24 For more on the relationship between the directedness of protention and intentionality, see Hua 
XI, 74-78 and the L Manuscripts (L I 16, 4a); see also Mensch 1999, 45-52 and Rodemeyer 
2003, 137-139. 
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of intentionality.25 It also makes possible the apperception, and hence the constitution, of objects. 256 
The movement beyond the (fulfilled) presence at work in protention opens up to me the 257 
possibility of other perspectives that are not my own, enables me to move beyond the merely 258 
present to apperceive objects in their combination of presence and absence (Hua XI, 190).26 259 
Fulfillment is “a unity of consciousness... that carries out a new constitutive 260 
accomplishment” (Hua XI, 75), and as such can be characterized as an associative synthesis (Hua 261 
XI, 76). Specifically, fulfillment is the unity between the full presentation of confirmation and 262 
the empty protentional presentation that makes possible the self-relatedness of the primal stream 263 
of absolute consciousness. This associative character obviates the need for a third “synthesizing” 264 
consciousness (Hua XI, 77), hence enabling the self-constituting nature that we have earlier seen 265 
                                                 
25 See the following manuscript by Eugen Fink, in his role as Husserl’s assistant: “Directedness, 
tending-to, is the fundamental character of consciousness-of in its most original essential 
composition” (Eugen-Fink-Archiv B-II 307), which is a (slight) modification of Husserl-Archiv 
L I 15, 35a. As translated in Bruzina 1993, 369 and 382 note 51. 
26 In terms of the previous section, we here see the “directedness” of protention as bearing on 
fulfillment in both its general and its particular functions. This “directedness” alone is not 
enough for apperception, however. A more complete account of apperception would need to 
augment our current analysis of protention with an analysis of expectation as it occurs in passive 
syntheses such as association. The relationship between protention and expectation would then 
need to be explained. For our current purpose of distinguishing protention from retention, 
however, such an augmentation is not necessary. 
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is necessary for absolute consciousness.27  This unity is possible because of a distinction in 266 
modes of bringing to intuition that marks the second essential difference between protention and 267 
retention. In protention, there are two distinct modes of bringing to intuition: the clarifying 268 
(picturing) mode, and the confirming (fulfilling) mode (Hua XI, 79-80). The first of these modes 269 
seeks to clarify, picture, or pre-figure the intended objective sense: because the “generality of 270 
expectation is always relatively determinate or indeterminate” (Hua XI, 79), it is necessary to 271 
determine more closely (Hua XI, 80) the field of possibility for the intended and expected object. 272 
Protention, then, enables expectation28 to clarify the intended object (specifically, its objective 273 
sense), and in this way it can be considered “disclosive” (Hua XI, 79). Here, expectation fills 274 
some of the emptiness of the intended object so that the intended object can coincide with a 275 
                                                 
27Husserl is adamant that retention does not arise on the basis of such an associative awakening 
that proceeds from the primal impression (Hua XI, 77). Though retentions may be able to acquire 
the associative awakening that belongs intrinsically to protention, this happens only occasionally, 
and only subsequently, that is, secondarily—it is not intrinsic to retention (Hua XI, 77). While 
this may seem to make Husserl’s position similar to that of Brentano, whom Husserl critiques in 
§§ 3-6 of Hua X (see also Kortooms 2002, 28-38), Husserl clearly claims that his position is 
distinct from, and does not succumb to the critiques that he himself leveled against, the position 
of Brentano; see Hua XI, 77 ff. 
28 On the distinction between protention and expectation, see Hua XI, 125-129. Briefly, 
protention is a “synthetically constituted form in which all other possible syntheses must 
participate” (Hua XI, 125). Association is one of these other possible syntheses. What protention 
is to internal time-consciousness, expectation is to association and passive constitution: the 
subject’s mode of relating to the future within that specific type of constituting consciousness. 
 164 
confirming-fulfilling intuition in a synthesis. The second mode of bringing to intuition, then, is 276 
“the specific fulfillment of intuition” that is the “synthesis with an appropriate perception” (79). 277 
Here, “the merely expected object is identified with the actually arriving object, as fulfilling the 278 
expectation” (79). Hence, these two modes of bringing to intuition help us see even more clearly 279 
how the type of fulfillment necessary for the self-constitution of the absolute stream of 280 
consciousness is possible.  281 
Husserl is again adamant, though, that these two modes of bringing to intuition occur 282 
only in protention. In retention, the problem is twofold. First, “retentions taking place 283 
originally... remain non-intuitive and sink into the undifferentiated general horizon of 284 
forgetfulness... Thus, only directed retentions, namely, retentions that have become intentions by 285 
such an [associative] awakening are at issue for a synthesis of bringing to intuition” (Hua XI, 286 
80).29 We have already seen, though, that for Husserl these “awakened” retentions are not, in 287 
essence, retentions. And even if we agree to take these modified and “awakened” retentions as 288 
the subject of our analysis, “we will realize immediately that the process of bringing to intuition 289 
as a clarifying process, and the process of bringing to intuition as a confirming one, are not 290 
sharply distinguished here, as is the case with protentions” (80). In the case of retentions, the 291 
synthesis that clarifies the sense of the intended object is simultaneously the synthesis that 292 
confirms the object as the fulfillment of the clarified intention. Though remembering can be a 293 
“picturing” or clarifying, “it cannot merely be a picturing; rather it is simultaneously and 294 
necessarily self-giving and thus fulfilling-confirming” (Hua XI, 81). This, perhaps, is another 295 
way of marking the “essential difference” that Husserl finds between protention and retention 296 
                                                 
29 This quote calls to mind again the distinction discussed earlier between the domain of intuition 
and the domain of non-intuitive differentiation; see Hua XXXIII, 227 ff., and Section III above. 
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already in (marginal additions to) On the phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time: 297 
protention “leaves open the way in which what is coming may exist and whether or not the 298 
duration of the object may cease and when it may cease,” while retention “is bound” (Hua X, 299 
297; see Husserl 1991, 309 note 42). In short, unlike retention, protention can remain essentially 300 
open. 301 
We can see, then, that protention is, and must be, distinct from retention. It is not merely 302 
an inverse retention, but is instead characterized by essential differences that help explain the 303 
possibility of the self-constitution of the stream of absolute consciousness. Protention, and 304 
protention alone, is necessarily directed (and thereby intentional) and able to bring to intuition 305 
both a clarifying and a confirming synthesis (and thereby make possible the knowledge of 306 
fulfillment). Hence, not only is protention essentially different from retention, but protention has 307 
a key role to play in phenomenology.  308 
 309 
V. Conclusion: Re-evaluating Retention in Light of a Positive Account of 310 
Protention 311 
 312 
Fully developing the implications of this positive account of protention for 313 
phenomenology is a new task called for by the conclusions of this paper. Though this task 314 
outweighs the present project, I would here briefly like to draw out the implications of a positive 315 
account of protention for Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, and especially for the concept 316 
of retention internal to that account. Doing so will help us begin to see the importance that this 317 
new account of protention will have in phenomenology. 318 
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As discussed in sections I and II above, Husserl’s account of internal time-consciousness 319 
is necessary to establish what Husserl will call “absolute consciousness,” and hence avoid 320 
problems of infinite regress that plagued the earlier accounts of time-consciousness put forward 321 
by Meinong and others. Retention was the key to establishing absolute consciousness, as its 322 
double-intentionality enabled one act to be simultaneously self-constituting and constitutive of 323 
objects. However, our new account of protention gives us reason to question this move. 324 
Specifically, it causes us to question to what extent retention can be described as “intentional” at 325 
all, let alone doubly-intentional.  326 
The problem arises from the lack of directedness or striving that marks one of the 327 
essential differences between retention and protention. If retention is not directed, if it does not 328 
strive in the way that protention does, it is then difficult to conceive of how it can be intentional, 329 
as an essential aspect of intentionality is its being necessarily directed.30 Therefore, it is difficult 330 
to conceive of how retention can be intentional, a problem that Husserl himself noticed: 331 
“retentions, as they arise in their originality, have no intentional character” (Hua XI, 77) though, 332 
as discussed earlier, this “does not rule out that in certain circumstances and in their own way 333 
they can assume this intentional character later” (Hua XI, 77). But if retentions are not 334 
intentional, as Husserl himself says, then surely they cannot be doubly intentional, as Husserl 335 
also states.31 Yet, the double-intentionality of retention was key to establishing the need for, and 336 
                                                 
30 See Fink’s citation of Husserl in note 25 above. 
31 My thanks to Osborne Wiggins for pointing this inconsistency out to me, and to the 
participants of the 38th annual conference of the International Husserl Circle, whose comments 
on an earlier draft of this paper were very helpful in developing the conclusions that I am now 
putting forth. 
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viability of, Husserl’s account of absolute consciousness. Hence, if one denies that (double) 337 
intentionality, one seems to lose the justification for Husserl’s discussion of absolute 338 
consciousness, and the possibility of transcendental phenomenology itself is called into question.  339 
But this extreme conclusion need not be reached. Rather, a clarification of our terms at 340 
this point helps us avoid this damning consequence while at the same time deepening our 341 
understanding of internal time-consciousness, in general, and retention, more specifically. This 342 
can be done by paying close attention to the “fundamental stratification” of cognitive life (Hua 343 
XI, 64). The key distinction at work in this stratification is that between “modal modifications of 344 
passive doxa, of passive intentions of expectation, their inhibitions passively accruing to them, 345 
and the like” (Hua XI, 52), on the one hand, and, on the other, the “spontaneous activity of the 346 
ego (the activity of intellectus agens) that puts into play the peculiar accomplishments of the 347 
ego” (Hua XI, 64), for example in judicative decisions. Husserl is clear that the latter position-348 
taking of the ego presuppose the passive doxa of the first level (Hua XI, 53). For our purposes, 349 
this stratification enables us to distinguish between conscious acts comprising the active level of 350 
the ego, and that which passively constitutes those conscious acts.32 Retention and protention 351 
belong properly in the passive group, and as such cannot be considered acts, properly speaking. 352 
Therefore, retention cannot possibly be the act that is doubly-intentional. Rather, retention and 353 
protention (that is, internal time-consciousness) make it possible that acts can be doubly-354 
                                                 
32 This “passive” level of constitution can itself be divided into two distinct realms of 
constitution: the “lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness 
in general” (Hua XI, 117), of which association is the prime example; and, the “universal, formal 
framework... in which all other possible syntheses must participate” (Hua XI, 125) that is internal 
time-consciousness. 
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intentional; retention and protention are necessary constitutive factors of the acts of 355 
consciousness, which themselves constitute the objects of our experience.  356 
This clarification helps us adequately understand the place of internal time consciousness 357 
in Husserl’s thought. It also helps us understand that retention—which is not yet an act—cannot 358 
possibly be intentional in the standard sense, namely as consciousness of (an object).33 Rather, it 359 
is more accurate to say that conscious acts are able to be intentional because of retention and 360 
protention, that is, because of internal time-consciousness. Within internal time-consciousness, it 361 
is protention that strives for fulfillment,34 and hence protention is more easily connected with 362 
intentionality, including the double-intentionality that makes possible absolute consciousness. As 363 
such, we can now fully appreciate Husserl’s suggestion in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das 364 
Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918) that protention might prove to be a more fruitful area of analysis for 365 
a phenomenological inquiry into absolute consciousness than is retention (Hua XXXIII, 225-6).  366 
The implications of the above are twofold: 367 
1. Retention and protention are not something we do:  because they are not acts, but are 368 
constitutive of acts, retention and protention are not something that we consciously “do.” It is, 369 
therefore, difficult, at best, and inaccurate, at worst, to talk of retaining, e.g., a perception of the 370 
color red. Rather, we perceive the color red, and are able to do so because of protention and 371 
retention. What exactly is retained, then, becomes difficult to discuss, as it is all too easy to 372 
                                                 
33 There can be no object on the level of passive constitution, as only the categorial object is an 
object according to Husserl; see Husserl 1948, p. 81 note 1, and Ryan 1977, 43. 
34 J.N. Mohanty describes intentionality as “a directedness towards a fulfillment”; Mohanty 
1972, 124. Given the discussion of protention and its relationship to fulfillment in Section IV 
above, this helps us see the inherent connection between protention and intentionality. 
 169 
conflate the retained and the perceived, though, properly speaking, what we can talk of as 373 
perceived cannot be that which is retained, as that which is retained is necessary for perception to 374 
occur. With this caveat in place, it would seem that both the hyletic datum of “red-ness” and the 375 
protentional directedness of each impression, directed again both to the object (special 376 
fulfillment) and to the different modes of that object’s being given to consciousness (general 377 
fulfillment), are retained. They are retained, not in the act of retention, but in the act of 378 
perception (here, specifically, the perception of something red). This distinction between acts of 379 
consciousness and that which constitutes those acts (including internal time-consciousness) must 380 
be rigorously maintained. 381 
2. It is especially, though not exclusively, because of protention that our acts can be doubly-382 
intentional: This conclusion runs contrary to Husserl’s claims that retention is doubly intentional 383 
(see Hua X, 380-381). As such, we should not affirm it too quickly. Protention and retention, 384 
taken together as internal time-consciousness, enable us to both perceive objects and conceive of 385 
ourselves as conscious of objects.35 Hence, internal time-consciousness enables us to be doubly-386 
intentional in the way necessary for absolute consciousness. However, within internal time-387 
consciousness, we can see that it is protention that strives for fulfillment, both because it is 388 
inherently directed and because it differentiates between clarifying and confirming modes of 389 
bringing to intuition. Hence, it is protention that is tied more closely to intentionality in general 390 
and, by extension, to double-intentionality as well. Of course, this is not to say that retention has 391 
no role to play in intentionality, as retention and protention necessarily refer to and employ each 392 
other, as discussed above. It is merely to say that protention bears some necessary relationship to 393 
                                                 
35 For more on the implications of Husserl’s account of absolute consciousness for discussion of 
identity and self-consciousness, see Zahavi 1999; Zahavi 2000; and Zahavi 2003.  
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intentionality that requires further analysis before any investigation into intentionality—single or 394 
double—can be said to be complete. 395 
Given these two implications, it is misleading to speak of retention as doubly-intentional. 396 
If one means by this that retention is the doubly-intentional act called for by Husserl to avoid 397 
infinite regress and thereby ground absolute consciousness, we see immediately that this runs 398 
contrary to the first implication of our analysis of protention which shows that retention and 399 
protention are not acts, but are constitutive of acts. On the other hand, if one wants to use the 400 
term “act” loosely here, and thereby mean only that retention is that which enables our 401 
consciousness to be doubly-intentional (even if it is, properly speaking, other acts that have this 402 
doubly-intentional character), we see that this too is not quite correct, as it runs contrary to the 403 
second implication of our analysis of protention. In fact, if one wanted to speak loosely and 404 
thereby attribute double-intentionality to either retention or protention, we see now that it seems 405 
more accurate, if one is forced to choose between the two, to ascribe this doubly-intentional 406 
characteristic to protention, rather than retention.  407 
 We can see, then, that the positive account of protention discussed in this paper helps us 408 
to clarify internal time-consciousness, in general, and retention in particular. I contend that this is 409 
but one area of phenomenology in which the positive account of protention would yield new 410 
insights. At the very least, as this discussion has already alluded to, the analysis of the different 411 
levels of consciousness, and hence the relationship between absolute consciousness and 412 
empirical experience, is also affected by this account of protention. The resulting influences of 413 
this would be felt in later phenomenological work, and could ripple out to such diverse fields as 414 
epistemology (via Husserl’s work on logic and experience), ethics (via the work of Levinas), 415 
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politics (via the work of Derrida) and psychology (via the work of Merleau-Ponty), to name a 416 
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